We examine how risk-sharing is impacted by asymmetric information on the probability distribution of wealth. We define the optimal incentive compatible agreements in a simple two-agent model with two levels of wealth. When there is complete information on the probability of the different outcomes, the resulting allocation satisfies the mutuality principle (which states that everyone's final wealth depends only upon the aggregate wealth of the economy). This is no longer true when agents have private information regarding their probability distribution of wealth. Asymmetry of information (i) makes ex-post equal sharing unsustainable between two low risk agents and (ii) induces exchanges when agents have the same realization of wealth.
Introduction
Transactions over the counter (OTC) are commonly used among financial institutions as a complement to the market. For instance, debt owners can use OTC contracts to transfer risk of default to other financial organizations. Such contracts are also used by insurance companies when they group together for reinsurance purposes. These pools of insurance companies are designed to share risk and avoid recourse to a reinsurance company, under what amounts to a "mutual risk-sharing agreement".
At the opposite end of the financial world, mutual agreements in small communities or villages are other examples of such risk-sharing mechanisms. When individual probability distributions of wealth are identically distributed, these risk-sharing contracts are aimed at lowering risk through the diversification principle. In this case the optimal agreement is always to equally divide the total wealth. By aggregating and dividing identically distributed risks, these contracts minimize risk in the sense of the mean-preserving spread criterion.
When individual probability distributions of wealth are not identically distributed, a simple equal sharing of the total bundle can be unacceptable for "low risk" individuals. In this case, equal sharing must be replaced by more sophisticated contracts that are designed to favor low risk agents. When, moreover, these distributions are private information, the positive effect of diversification can be strongly impeded if the expected heterogeneity is great. Parties can be mutually reluctant to share risk, fearing that the others may be highly exposed. This gives rise to a mutual adverse selection phenomenon: low risk individuals must be given incentive to participate in the agreement, but this incentive may induce high risk individuals to cheat on their probability distribution.
The question addressed in this paper is the following: what are the optimal risk-sharing contracts between two agents when the information on the probability distribution of wealth is private? We define the optimal Bayesian incentive sharing scheme between two agents that may differ in their probability of suffering damage. We then focus on the impact of asymmetric information on efficiency.
One of the main results of general equilibrium theory extended to uncertainty is the mutuality principle (see for instance Gollier, 2001 or the seminal paper by Borch, 1962) . Under complete information, all Pareto efficient allocations of risk are such that the final wealth of each agent only depends on the final value of aggregate wealth 1 . The allocation of this aggregate wealth then depends on the risk aversion of the agents. One of the questions addressed here is whether this principle can be maintained in an incomplete information framework. We analyze in which situations the equalsharing rule (which is optimal from a utilitarian point of view if agents are identical) is sustainable and study to what extent the mutuality principle continues to hold when information on the probability distribution of wealth is private.
We consider the simple case of two agents and two levels of (random) wealth. Either the agent suffers damage or not. We allow agents to be heterogeneous regarding their probability distributions of wealth: the individual probability of suffering damage can either be low or high. To share risk, the agents are willing to sign a bilateral contract that specifies contingent payments. To model this bargaining, we introduce a third uninformed party who plays the role of the principal in a "principaltwo agents" relationship. This principal designs a risk-sharing mechanism, an allocation rule that depends on the self-declared risk types of the agents. We look for mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive, i.e. such that telling the truth is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We focus on mechanisms that maximize an ex-ante utilitarian criterion.
The first finding of this paper is that, even under complete information, equal sharing of resources is not achievable if heterogeneity is great and/or if risk aversion is low. Because of the Hirshleifer effect, under asymmetric information, equal sharing is more likely to be optimal. However, when there is complete information on the individual probability distributions of wealth, the optimal sharing rule always satisfies the mutuality principle, in the sense that ex-post allocation only depends upon aggregate wealth. This is no longer the case when individual probability distributions of wealth are private information. When heterogeneity is too high and risk aversion too low, the introduction of asymmetric information rules out the mutuality principle.
This result provides an additional explanation for the failure of the mutuality principle highlighted in the empirical literature. Bayesian incentive constraints, in particular, make equal sharing unsustainable even when both agents are low risk, and induces exchanges when agents have the same realization of wealth. Finally, asymmetry of information induces changes in the sign of transfer (from low risk to high risk) in some states of nature for most utility functions of the HARA (Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion) class. When the asymmetry of information leads to a loss of efficiency, this loss is entirely borne by low risk agents, as in the case of insurance companies (see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 and Chade and Schlee 2008) .
We briefly discuss the relationship of this paper with the literature. First, our work fits into the literature on asymmetric information in risk-sharing agreements. In their study of dynamic mechanism design, Doepke and Townsend (2006) focus on the impact of asymmetric information but in the case of moral hazard with hidden income and hidden actions. In their work, hidden actions impact the probability distribution of income but agents are still ex-ante homogeneous and optimally follow the action recommended by the principal. We, however, focus here on ex-ante heterogeneous probability distributions. Genicot (2006) introduces heterogeneity among agents but focuses on inequality in wealth, while in this paper we examine heterogeneity in the distribution of wealth. To the best of our knowledge, the only work that models this aspect is Ligon and Thistle (2005) . The authors, however, assume equal sharing of wealth when considering the optimal size of a mutual firm (and end up with a separating equilibrium), whereas we specify the optimal sharing rule between heterogeneous agents.
Risk heterogeneity is taken into consideration to a greater extent in the literature on micro-credit.
For example, Townsend (2003) studies the effect of moral hazard on project financing. As our paper focuses on adverse selection, the most closely-related work seems to be Armendariz and Gollier (2000) , which models adverse selection in peer group borrowing. It specifies the optimal interest rate offered by competitive banks when agents are randomly paired. Thus, as cross subsidization amongst borrowers acts as collateral, group borrowing lowers interest rates. In their paper, however, the interest rate is the same for every type of individual and the bank is unable to extract information about the risk level of the borrowers. Here, we model a situation where the principal wants to extract information about the wealth distribution of each agent and provides the optimal risk-sharing agreement.
Our work also fits into the literature on informal insurance, and more precisely on the rejection of the mutuality principle in informal insurance. In his well-known empirical study of risk and insurance in village India, Townsend (1994) finds a significant impact of household income on household consumption after controlling for aggregate income. He thus rejects the mutuality principle. Since then, an extensive literature has analyzed the reasons for this failure in risk-sharing. However most of the theoretical papers explain this limitation by limited commitment and assume identical agents (see Kimball 1988 , Coate and Ravallion 1993 , Kocherlakota 1996 , Ligon et al. 2000 , and Genicot and Ray 2003 . In this paper, we suggest asymmetric information on wealth distribution as an alternative explanation.
Our model can be seen as contributing to the study of reinsurance markets. In his seminal paper, Borch (1960) models reciprocal reinsurance treaties as a two-person cooperative agreement similar to ours. He then shows (Borch 1962 ) that under complete information the optimal reinsurance scheme only depends on the total amount of claim, i.e. the mutuality principle holds. Doherty (1997) adds moral hazard to the discussion. He shows that financial tools can reduce the disincentive effects of reinsurance. Our paper now adds to the reinsurance theory literature by focusing on adverse selection.
It uses contract tools to build a reciprocal contract that gives insurers the incentive to reveal their risk distribution.
Our work is also related to the literature on adverse selection in insurance companies. Following Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) , many authors have analyzed how insurance companies deal with asymmetric information on the distribution of wealth. As we focus on a principal-agent model, our paper is more closely linked with works on monopoly insurance (see for example Stiglitz 1977 or Chade and Schlee 2008 regarding heterogeneity in wealth distribution and Landsberger and Meilijson 1994 regarding heterogeneity in risk aversion). The main result of these papers is to show that the optimal contract amounts to providing the "high type" (high risk type in the case of Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 , Stiglitz 1997 and Chade and Schlee 2008 , or the most risk-averse agents in Landsberger and Meilijson 1994) with full insurance and the other type(s) with only partial insurance.
Under general equilibrium, authors often use the Rothschild-Stiglitz model to discuss risk-sharing.
Following Prescott and Townsend (1984) , Bisin and Gottardi (2006) study the efficient equilibria in a competitive economy in the context of Rothschild and Stiglitz (i. e. when agents have private information regarding the probability distribution of their endowment). They show that while competitive equilibria always exist, they are not typically incentive efficient. However, after introducing a "right" paid to high risk agents by the insurance companies that exclusively insure low risk agents, Bisin and Gottardi find that competitive equilibria exist and are always incentive efficient.
Our work, however, differs from the literature on insurance companies through the distinction between private insurance contracts and risk-sharing agreements. Whereas insurance companies can rely on external capital, risk-sharing agreements only rely on the wealth of the contracting parties.
This has an important modeling consequence: in our case, the resource feasibility constraint has to be satisfied in every state, whereas in the case of insurance companies it has to be satisfied only in expectation. Put another way, in our paper agents always bear aggregate risk, whereas in the case of private insurance, this risk is borne by the risk-neutral insurer(s).
A recent paper by Picard (2009) tries to fill the gap between the studies on insurance companies and on mutual risk-sharing agreements. Allowing -in the Rothschild-Stiglitz model -the insurers to propose fully participating contracts (which amount to risk-sharing contracts), he restores the equilibrium 2 that then coincides with the Miyazaki-Spence-Wilson equilibrium (see Miyazaki 1977 , Spence 1978 and Wilson 1997 . Participating contracts act as an implicit threat that dissuades deviant insurers who aim at attracting low risk individuals only. Our work, however, differs from Picard's in that he studies market equilibrium in a competitive framework whereas we focus on optimal risk-sharing in a framework where it is the only instrument available to mitigate risk.
Finally, our work contributes to the literature on contract theory, by introducing behavior toward risk into the mechanism design. Indeed, in the case of risk-sharing, the transfers enter into the utility function. This leads to non quasi-linear preferences, thereby adding technical issues to those usual in Bayesian implementation, notably type-dependant outside option. This implies, in particular, that the objective function is not supermodular under contracts that satisfy the Bayesian incentive constraints.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the two-agent model of risksharing with a Bernouilli probability distribution. Section 3 discusses the benchmark case of complete information. In Section 4, we analyze the incomplete information case and characterize the optimal Bayesian incentive compatible sharing rule. Our concluding remarks and suggestions for future research are in Section 5.
The Model
Consider two risk-averse agents who face a risk on wealth. Wealth can either equal x or x = x − d (d > 0). Individual realizations are assumed to be independent and to follow a Bernoulli law with θ i the probability that individual i (i = 1, 2) has a bad outcome x. θ i can take two possible values θ and θ with 0 < θ < θ < 1 Θ ≡ {θ, θ} 3 . There are hence four states of nature ω : (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1) and (1, 1) that arise respectively with probabilities (1−θ 1 ).(1−θ 2 ), θ 1 .(1−θ 2 ), (1−θ 1 ).θ 2 and θ 1 .θ 2 . We denote π(θ 1 , θ 2 , ω) θ i ∈ θ, θ the probability that state ω occurs when individual 1 is of type θ 1 and individual 2 of type θ 2 . Let X i (ω) (either equal to x or x) be the realized level of wealth for individual i in the state ω and X(ω) = X 1 (ω) + X 2 (ω) be the aggregate wealth. Risk types are assumed to be independent 4 and we note µ ≡ µ(θ) ≡ prob(θ i = θ) and µ ≡ µ(θ) ≡ prob(θ i = θ) = 1 − µ Agents have a von Neumann utility function 5 u(.) which is supposed to be twice differentiable and strictly concave.
The timing is as follows:
• At date 1, agents learn their type
• At date 2, an uninformed principal proposes a risk-sharing mechanism Definition 1 A risk-sharing mechanism x specifies -in each state of nature -how aggregate wealth is shared among participants according to their type.
• At date 3, agents decide to participate
• At date 4, risk on wealth is realized and contract enforced.
We aim to model the optimal contract resulting from bargaining between two agents that have the same bargaining power. To do so, we assume that the benevolent principal puts the same weight on the two agents. As he is not informed of the agents' type, he hence uses an ex-ante utilitarian criterion to find the optimal sharing mechanism. Due to the concavity of u this implies that the mechanism is
Let us first examine the benchmark case where there is complete information on the individual probability distributions of wealth.
The Complete Information Benchmark
In the complete information case, the wealth distributions of both agents are common knowledge.
Two antagonistic forces are at work. First, the diversification principle encourages risk-sharing. When X 1 (ω) and X 2 (ω) are identically distributed,
is less risky (in terms of second order stochastic dominance) than X i (ω). Sharing aggregate wealth allows risk diversification and hence welfare improvement. However, faced with heterogeneity in wealth distributions, that is if X 1 (ω) and X 2 (ω) are not identically distributed, low risk individuals may not be willing to share the total bundle. To be individually rational, the sharing scheme must then be distorted in favor of low risk agents.
The utilitarian optimal contract is hence the solution of :
s.t.
It is then easy to state the following result.
Proposition 1 When there is complete information on individual wealth distributions, the optimal
(i) always satisfies the mutuality principle the optimal allocation only depends on aggregate
(ii) amounts to equal sharing of wealth in any configuration if risk aversion is high and heterogeneity in wealth distributions is low, that is if
(iii) if risk aversion is too low and heterogeneity too high
(a) equal sharing is optimal when both agents have the same type
(b) a low risk agent always gets more than average wealth when paired with a high risk agent
Proof: See Appendix.
Without participation constraints, the optimal utilitarian allocation would amount to equal sharing of the aggregate wealth:
The participation constraints may, however, make the optimal sharing rule differ from this allocation. Although high risk agents are always better off under the equal-sharing rule than under autarky, this may not be the case for low risk individuals. A high risk agent always profits from equal sharing as -whatever the type of individual she is matched with -it gives her higher expected utility than remaining alone. Being paired with another high risk individual, she benefits from the above-mentioned diversification principle; if paired with a low risk agent, she is more likely to receive transfer as there is more likelihood of her experiencing damage.
Conversely, a low risk agent benefits from equal sharing when paired with an individual of the same risk type, but may lose out when matched with a high risk agent.
When equation (2) is satisfied, equal sharing is optimal even if individuals do not face the same probability of damage. The left-hand side (greater than 1 for risk-averse agents) is an index of risk aversion whereas the right-hand side (also greater than 1) measures the heterogeneity of wealth distributions. It can indeed be written as 1 + (θ−θ)
. The right-hand side of (2) therefore increases with a mean-preserving spread of wealth distributions (θ − θ). Equal sharing is thus optimal when heterogeneity is sufficiently low or when risk aversion is sufficiently high.
When the above inequality does not hold, that is when heterogeneity is too great, equal sharing is not individually rational for low risk agents. To be participation proof, the optimal risk-sharing rule must provide the low risk individual with more than average wealth in every state of nature (even when she suffers damage and the other does not) when the agreement concerns two heterogeneous agents. The optimal risk-sharing rule still specifies full risk-sharing when agents are identical.
Obviously, even when it rules out equal sharing, the optimal allocation always satisfies the mutuality principle (when there is complete information on wealth distributions). Indeed, under the optimal allocation, individual wealth only depends on state of nature insofar as the aggregate wealth in that state is concerned
Asymmetric Information
We now turn to the incomplete information setting. When agents have private information on their wealth distribution, the risk-sharing agreement must be interpreted as a mechanism. According to the revelation principle, the principal offers a menu of contracts depending on risk types that gives agents the incentive to truthfully report their risk type.
In our setting, truthful reporting is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium if :
These interim Bayesian incentive constraints state that, knowing their own risk type but ignoring the type of the other party, all agents are better off (in expectation) truthfully reporting their type.
Moreover, under incomplete information, participation in the agreement is determined at the interim stage. The participation constraints therefore become:
As it only depends on realizations (and not on type), equal sharing obviously satisfies these Bayesian incentive constraints. The next proposition states that equal sharing is optimal if risk aversion is high and expected heterogeneity low.
Proposition 2 When agents have private information regarding their wealth distribution, equal shar-
Relative to the benchmark case of complete information, equal sharing is therefore more likely to be optimal. Indeed, the threshold
is lower than that obtained in the complete information
The asymmetry of information therefore has no impact on the optimal sharing rule when risk aversion is high and expected heterogeneity is low. In such cases, risk-sharing does not entail any loss of efficiency due to asymmetric information.
Violation of the mutuality principle
When expected heterogeneity is great, that is when
, the participation constraint of low risk agents binds at the optimum. Suppose first that incentive constraints do not matter. It is easy to see that the optimal sharing rule under participation constraints alone would
gives high risk individuals a strong incentive to cheat on their type. They would thus be better off declaring themselves θ whatever the type their opponent claimed to be
and
. Therefore, the optimal allocation under complete information does not satisfy the Bayesian incentive constraints of high risk individuals (3) and (5). It follows that, when the participation constraint of low risk agents binds, the incentive constraint of high risk agents necessarily binds too. This section is devoted to the general program under incomplete information.
Using ex-ante anonymity, the program becomes:
The solution is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When agents have private information regarding their wealth distribution and heterogeneity is too great
1. The mutuality principle is not sustainable: agents bear residual individual risk in some configurations;
2. The optimal agreement implies some exchanges when agents have the same realization of wealth.
First of all, it is worth noting that autarky is never optimal (see proof in appendix) and that the program has a unique solution. As shown above, in specifying equal sharing when both agents declare the same risk type, and giving more than half the aggregate wealth to the low risk agent when individuals are of different types, the complete information rule violates the Bayesian incentive constraint for high risk agents. To prevent these agents from cheating on their type, the principal has to distort the equal sharing contract when both agents claim to be low risk. By giving less to the agent that suffers the damage in these cases (x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) > x > x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0))), the contract makes it less profitable for high risk individuals to declare themselves θ. Since the optimal allocation depends on individual realizations, the mutuality principle no longer holds.
This result is consistent with previous empirical studies on risk-sharing in developing countries (starting with the seminal paper of Townsend (1994) ). Such studies find a significant impact of household income on household consumption after correcting by aggregate consumption. This failure of the mutuality principle has mainly been explained in the literature (Coate and Ravallion 1993 , Kocherlakota 1996 , Ligon et al. 2000 , Dubois et al. 2008 by limited commitment and self-enforceability.
When contracts cannot be enforced legally (as is the case in risk-sharing agreements in developing countries), an agent with a good realization of wealth has a high incentive to defect. She will, however, honor the agreement if the benefit she obtains from defection are outweighed by its cost: the breakdown of future profitable agreements. Previous work on limited commitment has shown that this cuts out the mutuality principle. Proposition 3 states that this failure can also be explained by risk heterogeneity and asymmetric information.
The above distortion moreover implies that equal sharing cannot be optimal, even when both individuals are low risk. When expected risk heterogeneity is too great, the asymmetry of information induces a loss of efficiency by reducing insurance when both agents are low risk. In this sense, asymmetric information here has the same impact on risk-sharing as it has on insurance companies (see Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976 and Chade and Schlee 2008) : a reduction in the coverage offered to low risk agents.
For the agreement to remain attractive to low risk agents, however, it has to compensate for previous distortions. This is done partly by specifying transfers from the high risk to the low risk individual when neither of the two agents suffers damage. Therefore, the optimal agreement implies some exchanges when agents have the realization of wealth.
The Case of HARA Preferences
To describe more precisely the optimal agreement under asymmetric information, we need to establish which constraints bind at the optimum.
The particular nature of our problem means that this cannot be done with the usual tools. More specifically, we are unable to establish the single-crossing property for the Bayesian incentive constraints. Many characteristics make our model non-standard, preventing us from using this standard simplifying property. In the case of risk-sharing (contrary to the usual principal-agent models) transfers enter into the utility function. This makes preferences non quasi-linear and the objective function not supermodular. Consequently, ex-post (that is, after transfer) utility is not increasing with type.
Moreover, the outside option is here type-dependent, so the single-crossing property cannot be established in the usual way.
In addition, we cannot rely on lotteries, as Landsberger and Meilijson (1994) do. In their paper on optimal insurance under asymmetric risk aversion, they use randomization of contracts to prove that only one incentive constraint binds at the optimum. Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) , however, show that randomization is never desirable when asymmetric information concerns risk type (and not risk aversion). In our case, the use of lotteries cannot weaken the incentive constraints as agents have the same behavior toward risk. Moreover, as the resource feasibility constraint here has to be satisfied in each state, the randomization cannot concern only one type of agent, as in Landsberger and Meilijson.
We are, however, able to solve the problem if agents' preferences exhibit HARA, that is if
(note that u(c) defined ∀c such that η + z γ > 0, increasing and concave for ξ(1−γ)γ −1 > 0). This broad class of utility functions, labeled Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion by Merton (1971) Proposition 4 Suppose that agents' preferences exhibit HARA with γ ≥ 1 2 . Then, when equal sharing is not achievable, the optimal sharing rule under asymmetric information is fully described by:
which implies ∀a ∈ {0, 1}, θ ∈ {θ, θ}
) with a strict inequality if a = 0 and θ = θ x 1 (θ, θ, (a, 1)) ≥ x 2 (θ, θ, (a, 1)) with a strict inequality if a = 1 and θ = θ
Therefore, the asymmetry of information on the probability distribution of wealth leads to a "counterintuitive" change in the sign of transfer (from low risk to high risk) in the state (1, 1) when agents declare themselves as different types x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 1)) > x .
Whatever the utility function, it can first be proven (all proofs are in the Appendix) by contradiction that the participation constraint of low risks and the incentive constraint of high risks necessarily bind at the optimum, whereas the participation constraint of high risks never binds. However, as stated previously, we cannot use the usual tools to show that only the incentive constraint of low risks does not bind.
To overcome this difficulty, we first derive the optimal allocation assuming that only the incentive constraint of high risks binds. We are then able to prove under HARA preferences with γ ≥ 1 2 that the two incentive constraints only cross once in the plane (ν 1 , ν 2 ) that fully describes the allocation.
It follows that the incentive constraint of low risk individuals is lax at the optimum. The assumption γ ≥ 1 2 does not seem too restrictive. It is always verified for CARA and logarithmic preferences.
Moreover, in the case of CRRA utility function, the literature seems to agree on a parameter of relative risk aversion γ larger than one (see Gollier, 2001 and Meyer and Meyer, 2005 ).
Under such a specification, Proposition 4 states that equal sharing is achievable (and thus optimal) when both agents declare themselves high risk x 1 (θ, θ, ω) = X(ω)/2 ∀ω . In contrast to low risk agents, high risk individuals therefore obtain their first best contract even when there is asymmetric information.
When both agents are low risks, ex-ante anonymity implies no transfer when realizations of wealth are the same (x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 0)) = x and x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 1)) = x). However, as shown in Proposition 3, equal sharing has to be distorted when two agents that declared themselves low risk experience different realizations (x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) > x > x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0))). This may be related to findings on insurance companies. Because of asymmetric information, under both insurance companies and risk-sharing agreements, low risk agents are not fully insured.
The second part of Proposition 4, however, states that this mechanism is not sufficient to prevent high risks from cheating. In the complete information setting, it has been shown that a low risk agent optimally gets more than equal sharing in any state of nature when matched with a high risk
In spite of previous distortion, this still gives high risk individuals an incentive to cheat. Previous mechanisms on x i (θ, θ, ω) indeed reduce the incentive to cheat when a high risk individual is paired with a low risk agent. However, the optimal allocation under complete information also gives an incentive to cheat in the case of two high risk agents as it specifies
= x 1 θ, θ, ω . To be incentive compatible, the optimal contract must therefore provide high risk agents with more than half the aggregate wealth in some states when agents declare different risk types. To induce the participation of low risk agents, this has to be done in states relatively less likely for them, that is when the low risk agent suffers the damage: (θ, θ, (0, 1)) and (θ, θ, (1, 1)).
A low risk individual would still accept the agreement as the contract would still be welfare improving if she is paired with another low risk agent. An interesting implication of this result is that asymmetric information entails, in state (1,1), a change in the sign of transfer (relative to the complete information benchmark). Whereas in this state, the transfer of wealth goes from high risk to low risk when the distributions of wealth are common knowledge, the optimal agreement under asymmetric information specifies a transfer from low to high risk.
The effect on efficiency of asymmetric information thus largely depends on the degree of heterogeneity. When the difference between the probabilities of damage of the two types is weak, there is no loss of efficiency due to the asymmetry of information. To this extent, risk-sharing seems more efficient than private insurance under asymmetric information conditions. However, when heterogeneity is too great, the asymmetry of information leads to a loss of efficiency with risk-sharing agreements too. As with insurance companies, this loss is entirely borne by low risk agents. However, it is difficult to compare the mechanisms behind loss of efficiency due to asymmetry of information in the two cases. This is because the optimal risk-sharing agreement depends on the risk types and realizations of both agents, whereas under private insurance the optimal allocations (e.g. Rothschild and 
Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the literature both on risk-sharing and mechanism design by characterizing the optimal mutual risk-sharing agreement between two heterogeneous agents in the presence of asymmetric information.
First, by placing the notion of risk within contracts, this work examines non quasi-linear preferences in Bayesian implementation. In spite of the technical issues this implies (mainly the non supermodularity of the objective function), we are able to solve the problem for a broad class of HARA utility functions.
Moreover, our paper provides an additional explanation for the failure of the mutuality principle in risk-sharing agreements. We show that equal sharing is not sustainable when risk heterogeneity is great and risk aversion is low. Yet, even when there is complete information on wealth distributions, the mutuality principle holds, as the allocation only depends upon the state of nature insofar as it concerns the aggregate realization. However, when agents have private information on their probability distribution of wealth, the optimal risk-sharing agreement does not prevent them bearing residual individual risk. Therefore, the failure of the mutuality principle observed in informal insurance can be explained by risk heterogeneity as well as limited commitment.
Another striking result of this work is that in order to give agents the incentive to reveal their risk type, a risk-sharing agreement has to specify transfers in some states where agents have the same realization of wealth. Finally, we show that the asymmetry of information induces changes in the sign of transfer in some states of nature (relative to the complete information benchmark) for most utility functions of the HARA class.
By analyzing the effect of asymmetric information on the efficiency of mutual risk-sharing agreements, this work also contributes to the literature on the differences in organizational structure in insurance. We show that the mutual structure copes better with asymmetric information since the asymmetry of information does not necessarily here lead to a loss of efficiency. This is consistent with previous findings that insurance companies always perform better under complete information, but cannot work when there is no information, contrary to mutual agreements. Moreover, when the asymmetry of information leads to a loss of efficiency, the loss is entirely borne by low risk type agents, as in the case of insurance companies (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Chade and Schlee 2008) .
In addition to these positive results, our work offers a framework for the design of risk-sharing contracts between financial institutions or insurance companies. In particular, it can be used to precisely design the direction of conditional financial cash flows.
Part of our work seems to be generalizable situations with more than two agents and/or more than two realizations. First, the condition on the sustainability of equal sharing should be easily extendable to a continuum of agents or realizations. Then, equal sharing appears optimal, even under imperfect information, if it provides the lower risk type agents with a higher expected utility than under autarky. In this case, the low risk agent would compare his probability of damage with the average probability of damage in the agreement. When this first best is not achievable, the failure of the mutuality principle also seems generalizable. To prevent high risk individuals from cheating about their type, it appears necessary to lower insurance for low risk agents. This would necessarily be done at the expense of complete risk pooling. A generalization to a continuum of agents would, however, be difficult to model as a contract would then specify an allocation of the aggregate wealth for every possible configuration of individual realization of wealth. The interim (participation and incentive) constraints would then involve combinatory probabilities.
Our model can also be extended to correlated wealth distributions. An attempt to study such cases is presented in the working paper version of the present work. Most of our findings (mainly propositions 1 to 3) also hold in the case of correlated types, but more attention needs to be given to the issue of single-crossing of incentive constraints.
It is left for future research to use our findings in an empirical context. Our work also seems to have implications for micro-credits. It would therefore be interesting to extend it to a situation where a bank tries -by setting the interest rate -to extract information about whether each of two borrowers involved in a micro-credit agreement is investing in a safe or a risky project.
Appendix Proof of proposition 1
If the Participation Constraints do not bind at the optimum, the solution of the utilitarian program is obviously:
This solution satisfies the participation constraints if :
That is :
As :
we obtain the result.
Proof of Proposition 2
If the Bayesian Participation Constraints do not bind at the optimum, the solution of the utilitarian program is obviously:
This solution satisfies participation constraints if and only if ∀θ 1 :
, the interim participation constraint is always verified
≥ 1 . For θ 1 = θ, the equal sharing rule satisfies the IPC if:
Proof of Proposition 3
Under asymmetric information the program is:
Let α(θ 1 , θ 2 , ω) , γ 1 , λ 1 , γ 1 , λ 1 , γ 2 , λ 2 , γ 2 , λ 2 be the respective Lagrange multipliers.
Because individuals are assumed to be ex-ante identical,
Lemma 1 The optimum is unique
Proof of Lemma 1
the program becomes:
In h 1 (.) and h 2 (.) we then have one strictly convex equality constraint and multiple linear inequality constraints. This defines a strictly convex constraint set. Since the gradient of the linear objective is not equal to the gradient of any linear constraint, the optimum must be unique.
Lemma 2 The mutuality principle is not sustainable and the optimal sharing rule implies exchange in some states where realizations of wealth are identical. Therefore, autarky is never optimal.
Proof of Lemma 2
The first order conditions of (13) can then be written as:
First of all, when both individuals declare themselves to be the same risk type and have the same initial wealth, ex-ante anonymity implies : x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 0)) = x 2 (θ, θ, (0, 0)) = x and x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 1)) = x 2 (θ, θ, (1, 1)) = x, ∀θ ∈ θ, θ (note that this is fortunately confirmed by the first order conditions). Now, when agents declare themselves to be the same risk type but have different initial wealth, the first order conditions lead to:
As θ < θ, we have A ≥ B and D ≥ C. The optimal sharing rule has thus to satisfy:
The Lagrange multiplier in brackets is the one that have to be null in order for the corresponding equation to be satisfied with equality.
The mutuality principle would imply in this setting that x 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 , (0, 1)) = x 1 (θ 1 , θ 2 , (1, 0)) and notably that:
• for θ 1 = θ 2 = θ, x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0)) = x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) = x 2 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) which would lead to λ = 0 by (14)
• for θ 1 = θ 2 = θ, x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0)) = x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) = x 2 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) which would lead to λ = 0 by (15) The mutuality principle would then be sustainable only if the complete information allocation were incentive compatible for both types of individuals λ = λ = 0 . Thus, the mutuality principle is not sustainable when
Finally, when agents declare themselves to be different risk types, the solution can be written as:
As B ≤ A, D ≤ C the following inequalities hold:
If there were no exchange when realizations of wealth are identical, that is if x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 0)) = x 2 (θ, θ, (0, 0))) = x and x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 1)) = x 2 (θ, θ, (1, 1))) = x, the six previous ratios would be equal to one. This implies λ = λ = 0, which has been shown to be impossible when heterogeneity is high. This implies in particular that autarky is not optimal and that the optimal sharing rule calls for exchange in some states where realizations of wealth are identical.
Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 3 The participation constraint for low risk individuals necessarily binds whereas the participation constraint for high risk individuals is always strictly satisfied at the optimum
Proof of Lemma 3
• If both participation constraints were binding, that is if γ and γ were both positive, by construction, the utilitarian expected utility achieved by autarky would be optimal. This has been shown to be impossible, by unicity of the optimum. Thus, one participation constraint necessarily does not bind.
• The first best allocation, which has been proven not to be optimal when
, satisfies the low risk individual constraint but not that of the high risk individual.
Therefore γ = 0 and γ > 0
Then,
Lemma 4 The Bayesian Incentive constraint for high risk individuals necessarily binds.
Proof of Lemma 4
Let us set :
the constraints become respectively:
• Bayesian Incentive constraint for low risk: π.δ ≥ 0
• Bayesian Incentive constraint for high risk: π.δ ≤ 0
• Participation constraint for low risk: π.v = 0
• Participation constraint for high risk: π.v < 0
Moreover we have v + v = δ.
Supposing λ = 0 leads by (15) to x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0)) = x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1)).
As λ and λ cannot be simultaneously null, it follows that λ = 0, which implies:
* π.δ = 0 and thus π.v + π.v = 0. Hence, since π.v = 0 , π.v = 0.
* by (16) and (17) it follows that:
We necessarily would have:
This implies :
≤ x 2 (θ, θ, ω) we have :
We hence would have :
The right-hand side of the previous inequality is equal to
and is therefore positive when
We thus end up with a contradiction, meaning that we necessarily have λ > 0. Therefore, the Bayesian incentive constraint for high risk individuals binds at the optimum.
Lemma 5 If preferences are HARA with γ ≥ 1 2 then, when
u (x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1))) > 1
Proof of Lemma 5
From lemma 4 we know that λ > 0. We are going to show that there is a solution of the optimization program with λ = 0. As we know that the solution is unique, the result will follow.
Let us set λ > 0, λ = 0, γ = 0 and γ > 0, which gives: 
u (x 2 (θ, θ, (1, 0))) u (x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0))) = 1
u (x 2 (θ, θ, (1, 0))) u (x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0))) = ν 1 ν 2 < 1 u (x 2 (θ, θ, (0, 0))) u (x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 0))) = u (x 2 (θ, θ, (1, 0))) u (x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0))) = ν 1 < ν 2 = u (x 2 (θ, θ, (0, 1))) u (x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1))) = u (x 2 (θ, θ, (1, 1))) u (x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 1)))
Let us first define the function ϕ(·, ·) as:
It is easy to show that ϕ(X, ν) is a strictly increasing function with X and ν, with ϕ(X, 1) = X and 2X − ϕ(X, ν) = ϕ X, u (ϕ(X, ν)) = u(X) 2ν 1/γ 1 + ν 1/γ 1−γ Using this function we have:
x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 0)) = ϕ(x, ν 1 )
x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0)) = ϕ( x, ν 1 )
x 1 (θ, θ, (0, 1)) = ϕ( x, ν 2 )
x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 1)) = ϕ(x, ν 2 )
x 1 (θ, θ, (1, 0)) = ϕ x, ν 1 ν 2
x 1 (θ, θ, (a, a)) = X(ω) 2
u 2 x − ϕ x,
and:
we can write π(θ) • δ as:
π(θ) • δ = (1 − θ) µP + µQ + θ µR + µS with P = (1 − θ) (u(x) − u (ϕ(x, ν 1 ))) + θ u ϕ x, ν 2 ν 1 − u (ϕ( x, ν 2 )) Q = (1 − θ) (u (2x − ϕ(x, ν 1 )) − u(x)) + θ (u (2 x − ϕ( x, ν 1 )) − u( x)) R = (1 − θ) u ϕ x, ν 1 ν 2 − u (ϕ( x, ν 1 )) + θ (u(x) − u (ϕ(x, ν 2 ))) S = (1 − θ) (u (2 x − ϕ( x, ν 2 )) − u( x)) + θ (u (2x − ϕ(x, ν 2 )) − u(x)) π(θ) • δ = 0 then represents the equation of the Bayesian incentive constraint of type θ in the plane (ν 1 , ν 2 ).
In the following, we prove that the two Bayesian incentive constraints only cross once (anticlockwise) in this plane (at the point ν 1 = ν 2 = 1).
Noting µP 2 µR 1 − µP 1 + µQ 1 µR 2 + µS 2 that is the sign of:
As P 1 ≤ 0, Q 1 ≤ 0, S 2 ≤ 0, R 2 ≤ 0, this sign is negative whatever µ if and only if R 1 P 2 ≤ P 1 R 2
We conclude, then, that when γ ≥ 1 2 , ∂Ω ∂θ is negative. Therefore, in the plane (ν 1 , ν 2 ) the curves (π(θ) • δ = 0) and (π(θ) • δ = 0) cross once at (ν 1 , ν 2 ) = (1, 1) Lastly, we prove that, at the optimum, we necessarily have ν 2 > 1.
Under the optimal contract, 
